Global Governance and Public Health: Obstacles and Opportunities by Geoffrey B. Cockerham

Author:Geoffrey B. Cockerham [Cockerham, Geoffrey B.]
Language: eng
Format: epub
Tags: International Relations, Public Policy, Social Policy, Political Science, General
ISBN: 9781786608505
Google: JeXaDwAAQBAJ
Goodreads: 40564198
Publisher: Rowman & Littlefield
Published: 2018-09-13T00:00:00+00:00

Bioterrorism

Bioterrorism has emerged as perhaps the most significant security issue for the potential use of biological weapons in the post-9/11 environment. Historically, however, not only have biological attacks by non-state actors been very rare, but also terrorist organizations have shown little interest in using such weapons as part of their tactics (Carus 2015). According to a report by the National Consortium for the Study of Terrorism and the Responses to Terrorism, only seventeen attacks involving a biological agent were used by terrorists from 1990 to 2011 (Pinson et al. 2013). In evaluating the impact of these attacks, however, not only have most of these attacks been unsuccessful, but they have also tended to be criminal actions aimed at selected targets for personal grievances or monetary gains rather than political, religious, or ideological motivations (Jansen et al. 2014).

The most active organization in biological attacks has been the Aum Shin-rikyo cult, which carried out seven biological attacks in Japan during the 1990s (Pinson et al. 2013). This doomsday cult’s most notable attack involved chemical weapons as the group launched a sarin gas attack on the Tokyo subway system in 1995 that killed twelve people and injured thousands more. Aum Shinrikyo, however, had developed an extensive biological weapons program as well. Before the sarin gas attack, the cult had built a laboratory in Japan to search for a usable biological agent to effectively weaponize. Their first attempt was with botulinum toxin, a substance that can be lethal in only small doses. To deliver this agent, members of Aum Shinrikyo used a vehicle to spray an area near the Japanese parliament as well as near a U.S. naval base and an international airport. All of these attacks proved to be unsuccessful. The cult also experimented with a bacterium that causes anthrax, but its efforts to spread this toxin also failed to contribute to any injuries or deaths. These fruitless attempts, however, motivated Aum Shinrikyo’s decision to abandon bioweapons and turn to sarin gas for its fatal 1995 attack (Rosenau 2001).

The Aum Shinrikyo attack and the 1998 bombing of American embassies in Tanzania and Kenya spurred the United States into attempting to enhance its defense from a biological attack. Protective measures included US$10 billion for annual funding of the weapons of mass destruction domestic preparedness program. Additionally, President Clinton included a civilian component to biodefense by integrating public health measures, especially disease surveillance into the program (Guillemin 2005). Nevertheless, the United States soon faced its most significant biological attack with the anthrax letters of September and October 2001. A week after the September 11 terrorist attack, letters containing anthrax spores were mailed to a variety of mass media offices. These letters were unopened, however, a photo editor for a tabloid became infected with anthrax at his office and later died. A couple of weeks later, a second set of letters was mailed including letters to Democratic Senators Thomas Daschle and Patrick Leahy. The Daschle letter was opened, resulting in contamination and closure of the Hart Senate Building near the U.

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